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Recent research lends credence to the belief that supply chain structure and product variety
are closely linked. We explore the effect of supply chain configuration on product variety, in
a competitive setting. We treat both non-functional as well as functional variety, and for
various supply chain configurations we examine equilibrium variety outcomes, assuming that
the structure of the market can be represented by a static one-period model belonging to the
class of Market Share Attraction Models.
1 Introduction
Recent research lends credence to the belief that supply chain structure and product variety are
closely linked (Ramdas (2002); Randall et al. (2002); Randall and Ulrich (2001)). Ramdas (2002)
provides a framework for understanding and explaining the relationship between variety and sup-
ply chain structure. Under this framework, variety decisions include variety-creation decisions that
determine the amount, type, and timing of end-product variety, and variety-implementation de-
cisions, which focus on the design of internal processes as well as a supply chain to support a
firm’s variety-creation strategy. Supply chain structure would therefore be categorized as a variety-
implementation decision under this framework. Using business examples, Randall et al. (2002)
explain that firms making the decision to offer high levels of product variety strategically choose
specific inventory structures. Randall and Ulrich (2001) characterize supply chain structure by the
degree to which production facilities are scale-efficient and by the distance of the production facility
from the target market. Using data from the U.S. bicycle industry they hypothesize that firms
with scale-efficient production will offer types of variety associated with high production costs, and
firms with local production will offer types of variety associated with high market mediation costs1.
This hypothesis implies that there is a coherent way to match product variety with supply chain
∗Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109.
1Market mediation costs include variety-related inventory holding costs, product mark-down costs occurring when
supply exceeds demand, and the costs of lost sales occurring when demand exceeds supply.
structure. Their empirical results suggest that firms which match supply chain structure to the
type of product variety they offer outperform firms which fail to match such choices.
Existing literature treats product variety as either of two types - non-functional variety or func-
tional variety. Examples of non-functional variety include videos in a video rental store and colors
of fabric lengths in a cloth shop (Schaffir (1963); Lancaster (1980); Hohenbalken and West (1991)).
Characteristics of such variety include similar demand and identical production and marketing costs
(Schaffir (1963); Kelvin Lancaster (1980)). Baumol and Ide (1956) consider variety simply as the
number of the different items available in a store and through a simple yet insightful model, consider
the effect of this aggregate variety on store profits. Schaffir (1963) conducts a marginal analysis to
examine profitability of adding an item to a set of existing items in a product line, that are avail-
able for sale. Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) empirically assess the impact of breadth of the product
line on profitability and market share and conclude that significant market share and profitability
benefits arise from having a broader product line. However, none of these papers consider variety
in a competitive setting, nor do they incorporate the effect of supply chain structure on variety.
Functional variety has been dealt with in economics literature through models similar in spirit
to that in Hotelling (1929). Rosen (1974) studies a spatial equilibrium in which the set of implicit
prices2 guides both consumer and producer location decisions in the characteristics space. Prescott
and Visscher (1977) consider a modification of Hotelling’s model in which location decisions are
made by firms sequentially, and once-and-for-all. Each firm takes into consideration the effect of its
location decision upon the ultimate configuration of the industry, and the equilibrium number and
location of firms are identified in specific examples. Stiglitz (1979) provides a descriptive account
of the nature of equilibria in markets with quality dispersion and product variety, under imperfect
information. Anderson et al. (1995) apply discrete choice models3 to oligopolistic competition
and deduce the equilibrium number of firms. Shaked and Sutton (1982) consider a game-theoretic
model of monopolistic competition in which potential entrants compete in three stages - entry,
quality choice and price. They conclude that the only perfect equilibrium is one in which only two
firms enter. None of the above papers study the effect of supply chain structure, though competition
is modelled in some of them.
Additional examples observed in practice reinforce the belief that variety and supply chain
structure are indeed related. Radio Shack r©manufactures electronics and communications products
and offers limited variety within each family in its broad product line. Radio Shack stores operate
on a franchise basis and exclusively offer Radio Shack products in addition to few other brands. Best
BuyTM stores, on the other hand, operate as retail outlets for various manufacturers and compete
with Radio Shack franchises. Best Buy has certain product families in common with Radio Shack,
but offers greater product variety in each of these families. For instance, in the portable CD player
family, as on August 30, 2002, Best Buy offered 36 brands of portable CD players while Radio
Shack offered only 10.4 Similarly, Do it Best r© and Home Depot r© have different supply chain
2Customers have utilities for characteristics of a product; associated with these utilities are implicit prices.
3Discrete choice models are used to describe heterogeneous customer tastes.
4Information obtained from www.bestbuy.com and www.radioshack.com.
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arrangements and offer different levels of variety in their common and hence competing product
families.
However, it is not clear whether existing supply chain configuration and firms’ desire for prof-
itability result in the observed product variety, or whether customer demand for variety and firms’
desire for profitability result in the observed supply chain configuration. In this paper we treat both
non-functional and functional variety and examine the impact of supply chain configuration and
the competition within, on equilibrium variety.
We consider two competing retailers catering to the same geographic market. These retailers
have to decide on variety, i.e., the brands to offer and volume in each brand, and the price for
each brand. We focus on a particular product family and define an offering5 as the triple (i, j, pij)
where pij is the price for brand j at retailer i. These offerings are partially substitutable. The
demand for an offering decreases with an increase in its own price, and increases with an increase
in a competing offering’s price. We assume that all customer demand must be satisfied.6 The
retailers’ objective is to maximize total product family profit; they source their products from profit-
maximizing manufacturers. The aforementioned decisions and resulting equilibrium outcomes are
influenced by the structure of the supply chain (e.g. whether decentralized or centralized) and
the retailers’ and manufacturers’ cost structures (e.g. dependence of cost on variety). We assume
complete information. For various supply chain configurations, we analyze the resulting games and
their equilibrium outcomes, assuming that the structure of the market can be represented by a
static one-period model which belongs to the class of Market Share Attraction Models.
In general, a market share attraction model specifies that the market share of a firm, in either
quantity or revenue terms, is equal to its “attraction” divided by the total attraction of all firms in
the market, where a firm’s attraction is a function of the values of its marketing instruments. Such
models are theoretically appealing because they are logically consistent; they yield market share
values that are between zero and one, and these values sum to one across all firms in the market
(Karnani, (1985)). Karnani (1985) investigates the conduct of firms and the performance of the
market when the structure of the market can be represented by a static one-period market share
attraction model. The solution concept of a Nash equilibrium is used, and strategic implications
of such an equilibrium are deduced. It is shown that, at equilibrium, each active competitor must
have market share above a certain threshold value, and that this threshold value is a function of
both - the cost structures of the firms as well as the demand structure of the market. The model
also predicts a positive relationship between market share and profitability. It is shown that these
implications are consistent with previous empirical research in marketing and business policy. Bell et
al. (1975) provide examples of empirical studies that have used the attraction specification to model
market shares. Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) provide a thorough treatment of market-share models.
They demonstrate how model extensions can accommodate differential and cross-competitive effects
(Lilien et al. (1992)). To further justify our choice of a market share attraction model, we quote
5Where unambiguous, the terms brand and offering are used interchangeably.
6In practice, a customer can place an order with the store if the demanded item is not available in stock.
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Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) - “We report that many studies on predictive accuracy of market-share
models found the logical-consistency property of the (market share attraction) models to produce
only marginally better predictions than the linear and multiplicative models. Why then all this fuss
about the (market share attraction) models? ...we do not believe that predictive accuracy is the
only important criterion for judging the value of a model. We would rather find the answer in the
construct validity (i.e., intrinsic meaningfulness) of market share attraction models.”
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research to date which explores the effect of supply
chain configuration on product variety in a competitive setting. In particular, we consider the
supply chain configurations as in Figure 1. M stands for manufacturer and R for retailer. The
supply chain structures we consider are similar to those in McGuire and Staelin (1983). The dotted





DD: Decentralized, Distributed 
M1 M2 
R1 R2 
CD: Centralized, Distributed R1 R2 
M 
DS: Decentralized, Shared 
Figure 1: Supply Chain Structures Considered
In the CD structure, Mi and Ri are one integrated firm Fi. The sequence of actions in the
game is as follows. The Fis simultaneously decide their sets of offerings {(i, j, pij)}, demand for
each offering is realized, and finally costs are spent and revenues are received. Note that in all
cases pij = ∞ implies that brand j is, in effect, not offered by retailer i. In the DD structure, Mis
and Ris are separate entities. The sequence of actions in this game is as follows. Simultaneously,
the Mis decide on the linear wholesale prices wijs to offer to the respective Ris, then the Ris
simultaneously decide their sets of offerings {(i, j, pij)}, demand for each offering is realized, and
finally costs are spent and revenues are received. In the DS structure, M and Ris are separate
entities. The sequence of actions in this game is as follows. M decides on the linear wholesale
prices wijs to offer to the Ris, then the Ris simultaneously decide their sets of offerings {(i, j, pij)},
demand for each offering is realized, and finally costs are spent and revenues are received.
As a logical buildup, the sections progress from the CD structure to the DD structure and
finally to the DS structure. For each structure, we begin with the single brand7 case and then
extend the analysis to the multiple brand setting. In the single brand case, retailers have access
7“In No Choice, Klein indicates how the promise of a huge array of consumer choice has been betrayed by
mergers, franchising and corporate censorship. Single-brand stores now predominate in many urban centres - Nike
4
to one brand each, whereas in the multiple brand case, each retailer can offer a subset of several
available brands. Our notation and specifications of market share and profit functions are similar
to those in Karnani (1985). However, we assume that marketing expenses are sunk and that the
retailers compete on product price alone.
2 Centralized Distributed (CD) Configuration
In the CD configuration, the integrated firms Fis compete for final demand. We begin by analyzing
the single brand case and then move on to the multiple brand setting. As mentioned above, our
notation and specifications of market share and profit functions are similar to those in Karnani
(1985).
2.1 Single Brand Case
Notation:
pi = product price at retailer i
ci = cost parameter for retailer i
yi = sales volume in physical units for retailer i
βi = factor representing economies of scale for retailer i; 0 < βi ≤ 1
Ki = factor capturing ‘attractiveness’ of retailer i’s offering
si = market share in terms of revenue for retailer i
Qi = factor representing the contribution of relative market share to profitability of retailer i
−i = index for i’s competing retailer
R = total market size in terms of revenue
Vi = profit function for retailer i
α, θ are industry-specific parameters.
α > 0 captures the price sensitivity of demand in the industry. As in Karnani (1985) we assume
that consumers in the industry have decreasing marginal utility and that the total market size is a
non-decreasing, concave function of the total attraction. Since we assume that the retailers compete














θ, 0 ≤ θ < 1 (1)
Since retailers competing in the same market are concerned with profitability as well as relative
market share, we specify the objective8 for retailer i as:
Town, Roots, The Body Shop - and single-brand pioneer Disney has gone far beyond Disney World to create the
Disney Magic cruise ship, and Celebration, Fla., where you can live the complete Disney life.” - Bronwyn Drainie,
“Brand names? Hate ’em,” The Globe and Mail, January 15, 2000.
8Since we consider a competitive one-period model, relative market share can be thought of as a surrogate for
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Note that in this specification, the quantity sold by retailer i is a function of prices pi and p−i.
2.1.1 Parameter Restrictions
The results of this subsection apply to the single brand cases of all the supply chain structures
considered. In order for the model to be a reasonable representation of reality, we need to specify
ranges of admissible values for its parameters. We therefore state the following.
Proposition 1 For self-price elasticities to be negative and cross-price elasticities to be positive,
the parameter θ should satisfy 0 ≤ θ < 1.













−α(Kipi−α)(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α)θ−1 + α(1− θ)(Kipi−α)2(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α)θ−2
(Kipi−α)(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α)θ−1
=
−α(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α) + α(1− θ)(Kipi−α)
(Kipi−α)(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α)
Since α, pi, p−i, Ki, K−i ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is a sufficient condition for νi,i to be negative.












= α(1− θ)(K−ip−i−α)(Kipi−α + K−ip−i−α)−1
θ < 1 is a necessary condition for ηi,−i to be positive.
future earnings. The profit function in Karnani (1985) does not include this additional term. Hiam and Schewe
(1992) note that a striking trend in the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy (PIMS) database is that market share
and return on investment (ROI) vary together. A smaller share is associated with a lower ROI and vice versa. In fact,
the relationship is virtually a straight line, varying from an average ROI of 11 percent for businesses with market
shares of 10 percent or less, up to an ROI of 40 percent for businesses with shares of 50 percent or more.
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2.1.2 Analysis
Retailer i’s profit function is not concave in price pi - but a simple reformulation elegantly permits
us to establish properties relating to the retailers’ profit functions. Defining9 xi := p
−α
i , mi :=
βi
α





Lemma 1 Profit function Vi is strictly concave in xi if mi − ni > 1. Thus, if mi − ni > 1, there




α that uniquely maximizes Vi.
10
Proof: For notational convenience, denote
Ii := (Kixi)(Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−1 + Qi xix−i ;
Ci = x
mi














= (1− θ)(2− θ)K3i xiAθ−3 − 2(1− θ)K2i Aθ−2




























If mi − ni > 1, then
mi(mi − 1)− 2mini + ni(ni + 1) = (mi − ni)2 − (mi − ni) > 0,




9Note that the function x = p−α is a monotonic one-one correspondence. Also note that a concave function of a
monotonic function is pseudo-concave.
10Karnani (1985) differentiates a similar profit function with respect to price and equates the derivative to 0, in
order to arrive at the optimal price. Numerical counterexamples demonstrate that without restrictions as in Lemma
1 the profit function in Karnani (1985) is, in some situations, quasi-convex and therefore that the use of first order
conditions can yield a non-optimal price.
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Since Vi = Ii − ciKβii Ci, from (3) and (5) we have d
2Vi
d2xi
< 0, i.e., the profit function Vi is strictly
concave in xi if mi − ni > 1. Thus, if mi − ni > 1 there exists an x∗i that uniquely maximizes
Vi. Since the function xi = p
−α








From this point forward, we will assume that mi−ni > 1, ∀i. This translates into the following
condition on the model’s parameters.
α
1 + αθ
< β ≤ 1 (6)
In other words, for the profit function, Vi, to be concave in the transform, xi, of price, economies
of scale cannot be arbitrarily large.11
We will also assume that the retailers will not sell at zero price. This means that xi is bounded
above for all i. Let Bi denote an arbitrarily large upper bound on xi. We denote the strat-
egy space for retailer i as Si = {xi : xi ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi} and the set of strategy profiles as
X = {x := (xi, x−i) : xi ∈ Si, x−i ∈ S−i}. Denote x∗i (x−i) as retailer i’s profit maximizing (best
response) to x−i. We state the following fact by inspection of the profit function Vi.
Fact 1 (a) Qi = 0 ⇒ x∗i (0) < ∞; (b) Qi = 0 ⇒ x∗i (∞) < ∞; (c) Qi > 0 ⇒ x∗i (0) = ∞; (d)
Qi > 0 ⇒ x∗i (∞) < ∞.
Proof: (a) By contradiction. If x∗i (0) = ∞, since mi−ni > 1, the term ciKβii xmii (Kixi +K−ix−i)−ni
in the expression for Vi dominates so that Vi = −∞. We are better off choosing xi(0) = 0.
(b) By contradiction. If x∗i (∞) = ∞, since mi − ni > 1, the term ciKβii xmii (Kixi + K−ix−i)−ni in
the expression for Vi dominates so that Vi = −∞. We are better off choosing xi(∞) = 0.
(c) If x∗i (0) = ∞, the term Qi xix−i in the expression for Vi dominates so that Vi = +∞.
(d) By contradiction. If x∗i (∞) = ∞, since mi − ni > 1, the term ciKβii xmii (Kixi + K−ix−i)−ni in
the expression for Vi dominates so that Vi = −∞. We are better off choosing xi(∞) = 0.
Lemma 2 The reaction function x∗i (x−i) is downward sloping when Qi →∞.
Proof: Since the profit function Vi is concave in xi, the first order condition,
dVi
dxi
= 0, yields the
reaction function x∗i (x−i).
dVi
dxi




11We believe that this is not a restrictive assumption. Note that lower β implies greater economies of scale. Several
numerical examples indicate that if economies of scale are larger than that specified by the bound in (6), the profit
function behaves in a non-concave manner.
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From Lemma 1, we know that ∂f
∂xi
< 0. When Qi → ∞, ∂f∂x−i < 0, and dxidx−i < 0. Thus, when
Qi →∞, the reaction function x∗i (x−i) is downward sloping.
The reason for stating Lemma 2 in the above manner is because a closed form expression for the
threshold value of Qi, above which the reaction function is downward sloping, does not exist. The
Lemma helps in supporting the fact there is a threshold value of Qi, perhaps large, beyond which
the optimal response to a price decrease, is a price increase. Figure 2 shows a typical response curve
for large Q.














Figure 2: Downward Sloping Reaction Function (Q large)
The reason for the observed shape can be explained as follows. For a low value of x1 there are
large revenue and market share benefits to R2 in responding with a high x2. As x1 increases, some
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market share benefits still remain with R2 but since market size grows, it becomes costly for R2 to
serve the market and therefore R2 responds by decreasing x2. As x1 is increased further, it becomes
increasingly costly to serve the growing market and R2’s optimal response is to decrease x2. Facts
1(c) and 1(d) corroborate this explanation.
The following observation is stated without mathematical proof because of absence of closed
form expressions.
Observation 1 The reaction function x∗i (x−i) is unimodal when Qi = 0.
Observation basis: The graph in Figure 3 from a numerical example depicts the typical form of
the response function x∗i (x−i). Reaction functions in all numerical studies conducted behaved in an
identical manner.














Figure 3: Unimodal Reaction Function (Q = 0)
An explanation for the above behavior is that as x1 increases from 0, R2 responds by increasing
x2 with the aim of getting a larger fraction of the market revenue. This continues but only up to
a particular point. At this threshold, both R1 and R2 have a low price, and the market size is
relatively large and costly to serve. If R1 increases x1 beyond this threshold, R2 has to respond by
now decreasing x2 in order to keep the market size under control and to still profitably serve the
market. Facts 1(a) and 1(b) corroborate to this explanation.
Lemma 3 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.
Proof: The strategy space Si = {xi : xi ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi} of retailer i, is a non-empty compact
convex subset of the Euclidean space <1. The profit function Vi is continuous in x := (xi, x−i) and
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concave in xi. Therefore, using Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), there exists at least
one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.
Define the symmetric case (SC) as one in which Ki = K−i = K, ci = c−i = c, βi = β−i = β,
Qi = Q−i = Q.
Proposition 2 An asymmetric equilibrium is possible even in the symmetric case, i.e., there are
SC situations in which, at equilibrium, x∗i 6= x∗−i, and therefore p∗i 6= p∗−i.
Proof: By example. Consider the numerical example with the following parameter values: K =
100, Q = 2, α = 1, θ = 0.4, β = 0.75, c = 1.5. There are three Nash equilibria, i.e., three
points at which the reaction curves x∗i (x−i), and x
∗
−i(xi) intersect. One is a symmetric equilibrium
and the other two are asymmetric. Figure 4 shows one asymmetric equilibrium and the symmetric
equilibrium.

























Figure 4: Example of Asymmetric Equilibrium
In the numerical example, the asymmetric equilibria in terms of transform of price are x1:=
(0.3157, 9.4707) and x2:= (9.4707, 0.3157). In terms of price these equilibria are p1:= (3.1676,
0.1056) and p2:= (0.1056, 3.1676) respectively. Asymmetric equilibria exist because of the shape of
the reaction curve. As explained before, for large enough Q, the reaction curve is downward sloping.
For a low xi, the optimal response of R−i is a high x−i because of large revenue and relative market
share benefits. With an increase in xi, R−i’s relative market share benefit decreases at a faster rate
than cost, with the result that R−i best responds by decreasing x−i convexly in order to keep the
market size under control. As Figures 5 and 6 point out, R−i’s best response to xi= 0.3157, is x−i=
11
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 = 9.4707  
Figure 5: x−i = 9.4707 is the best response to xi = 0.3157
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 = 0.3157 
Figure 6: xi = 0.3157 is the best response to x−i = 9.4707
9.4707; and Ri’s best response to x−i= 9.4707, is xi= 0.3157.
2.2 Multiple Brand Case
For the multiple brand case, we use an additional index which represents the index of a particular
brand at a particular retailer. As mentioned earlier, pij is the price for brand j at retailer i. Notation
for other parameters and variables are to be similarly interpreted. Assume that the number of brands








































, where 1 ≤ j ≤ ξ1, and 1 ≤ k ≤ ξ2.
2.2.1 Parameter Restrictions
The results of this subsection apply to the multiple brand cases of all supply chain structures con-
sidered.
Proposition 3 For self-price elasticities to be negative and cross-price elasticities to be positive,
the parameter θ should satisfy 0 ≤ θ < 1.






The proof that 0 ≤ θ < 1 is a sufficient condition for νij,ij < 0 is identical to the corresponding
proof in Proposition 1.























































Since α, pij, p−ik, Kij, K−ik ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θ < 1 is a required condition for ηi,−ir to be positive.
2.2.2 Analysis
Lemma 4 Profit function Vi defined above is strictly jointly concave
12 in xi := {xij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi} if
mij − nij > 1 ∀j. Thus, if mij − nij > 1 ∀j, there exists a vector of prices p∗i = {p∗ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi}




α ), that uniquely maximizes Vi.
12Briefly stated as “jointly concave in xijs”
13







θ−1 is strictly jointly concave










θ−1 is strictly jointly concave in xijs, where Aijs are positive constants. We are










































































































f({x(1)ij }) + f({x(2)ij })
2



















−nij is strictly jointly convex in the




(where Aijs are positive constants), assuming that mi1 − ni1 > 1. We first consider the case when
ξi = 2. Denote f(x, y) := x
m(1 + A1x + A2y)
−n. We use the Hessian matrix to show that f(x, y) is
jointly convex in (x, y).
fx = mx
m−1(1 + A1x + A2y)−n − nxmA1(1 + A1x + A2y)−n−1
fxx = m(m− 1)xm−2(1 + A1x + A2y)−n − 2mnxm−1A1(1 + A1x + A2y)−n−1
+ n(n + 1)xmA21(1 + A1x + A2y)
−n−2
fy = −nxmA2(1 + A1x + A2y)−n−1
fyy = n(n + 1)x
mA22(1 + A1x + A2y)
−n−2
fxy = −mnA2xm−1(1 + A1x + A2y)−n−1 + n(n + 1)xmA1A2(1 + A1x + A2y)−n−2
For fxx > 0, require that m(m− 1)(1 + A1x + A2y)2− 2mnxA1(1 + A1x + A2y) + n(n + 1)x2A21 > 0
i.e.,
m(m−1)(1+A21x2+A22y2+2A1x+2A2y+2A1A2xy)−2mn(A1x+A21x2+A1A2xy)+n(n+1)A21x2 > 0
The above will hold if m(m−1)−2mn+n(n+1) > 0; i.e., if (m−n)2−(m−n) > 0; i.e., if (m−n) > 1.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is fxxfyy − f 2xy.
fxxfyy−f 2xy = mn(m−1)(n+1)A22x2m−2(1+A1x+A2y)−2n−2−m2n2x2m−2A22(1+A1x+A2y)−2n−2
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fxxfyy − f 2xy > 0, if mn(m− 1)(n + 1)−m2n2 > 0; i.e., if (m− n) > 1.
Since fxx > 0 and fxxfyy−f 2xy > 0, the Hessian matrix is positive definite. Thus, when (m−n) > 1,
f(x, y) := xm(1 + A1x + A2y)
−n is strictly jointly convex in (x, y). We now prove the strict joint
convexity of xmi1i1 [1 +
∑
j Aijxij]






























































































Which proves the strict joint convexity of xmi1i1 [1 +
∑
j Aijxij]



















is clearly jointly concave in xijs, we conclude that the profit function
Vi for retailer i is strictly jointly concave in xijs if mij − nij > 1 ∀j. The function x = p−α is a one-
one correspondence. Hence, if mij − nij > 1, there exists a vector of prices, p∗i = {p∗ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi}




α ), that uniquely maximizes Vi.
Denote the strategy space for retailer i as the ξi-dimensional space Si = {xij : xij ∈ <1, 0 ≤
xij ≤ Bij}ξi and the set of strategy profiles as X = {x := (xi,x−i) : xi ∈ Si,x−i ∈ S−i}.
Lemma 5 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.
Proof: The strategy space Si = {xij : xij ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xij ≤ Bij}ξi of retailer i, is a convex, non-empty,
closed and bounded and therefore compact subset of the Euclidean space <ξi . The profit function
Vi is continuous in x := (xi,x−i) and concave in xi. Therefore, using Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1998), we conclude that there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
game.
3 Decentralized Distributed (DD) Configuration
In this configuration, the sequence of actions is as follows. Simultaneously, the Mis decide on the
linear wholesale prices wijs to offer to the respective Ris, then the Ris simultaneously decide their
15
sets of offerings {(i, j, pij)}, demand for each offering is realized, and finally costs are spent and
revenues are received.
3.1 Single Brand Case
The profit function for manufacturer Mi, is VMi = wiyi − ciyβii , and that for retailer Ri is Vi =
piyi − wiyi −Ei + Qi sis−i = (Kixi)(Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−1 − wiKix
α+1
α
i (Kixi + K−ix−i)
θ−1 −Ei + Qi xix−i .













> 0, since 0 < βi < 1.






From this point forward, we will assume that profit function VMi is increasing in yi.
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Fact 3 Given wholesale prices wis, retailer Ri’s profit function Vi is strictly concave in xi if mi −
ni > 1. Thus, if mi − ni > 1, there exists p∗i = x∗i−
1
α that uniquely maximizes Vi.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we know that (Kixi)(Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−1 −Ei + Qi xix−i is strictly concave in
xi. It suffices to show that Ψi := x
a
i (Kixi + K−ix−i)
θ−1 is convex in xi, where a = α+1α > 1.
dΨi
dxi
= axa−1i (Kixi + K−ix−i)
θ−1 − (1− θ)Kixai (Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−2
d2Ψi
dx2i
= a(a− 1)xa−2i (Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−1 − 2a(1− θ)Kixa−1i (Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−2
+ (1− θ)(2− θ)xai K2i (Kixi + K−ix−i)θ−3
= K2i x
2
i [a(a− 1)− 2a(1− θ) + (1− θ)(2− θ)] + K2−ix2−i[a(a− 1)]
+ 2aKiK−ixix−i[(a− 1)− (1− θ)] (9)
13yi > ( ciβiwi )
1
1−βi may not hold when yi ≈ 0+. However, for most practical situations, it is safe to make the said
assumption
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Consider the terms within square braces in (9) separately.
a(a− 1)− 2a(1− θ) + (1− θ)(2− θ) = (a + θ)2 − 3(a + θ) + 2 > 0, since a + θ > 1.
a(a− 1) > 0, since a > 1.
(a− 1)− (1− θ) = a + θ − 2; (mi − ni) > 1 ⇒ a− (1− θ) > 1β ⇒ a + θ − 1 > 1.
Since Ki, K−i > 0, the right hand side of (9) is greater than 0, implying that Ψi := xai (Kixi +
K−ix−i)θ−1 is strictly convex in xi.
Proposition 4 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the
retailers.
Proof: Given wholesale prices wis, the strategy space Si = {xi : xi ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi} of retailer i, is
a non-empty compact convex subset of the Euclidean space <1. The profit function Vi is continuous
in x := (xi, x−i) and concave in xi. Therefore, using Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998),
there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the retailers.
Lemma 6 There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the overall game.
Proof: Let W ∗i be an arbitrarily large upper bound on wholesale price wi such that if Mi prices be-
yond this bound then Ri would stay out of the market and make zero profit rather than participate
in the market and make a loss. Such an upper bound exists because as wi →∞, Vi → −∞. Thus
the strategy space of Mi is constrained to be a closed and bounded convex, compact set [0, W
∗
i ].
Since the extensive form game is finite and strategy spaces of Mis and Ris are closed and bounded,
using the technical properties in section 8.3.3 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) we conclude that
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the overall game.
Corollary 1 There exists at least one subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the overall
game.
Proof: Since for any specification of wholesale prices there exists at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the subgame between the retailers, it is possible to deduce equilibrium y∗i s (derived
from equilibrium x∗i s), for all combinations of wi between 0 and W
∗
i and w−i between 0 and W
∗
−i.
Since Mi’s profit is assumed to be increasing in the quantity yi sold to Ri, we can pick w
∗
i which
results in the largest equilibrium y∗i , given w−i. The continuous reaction functions w
∗
i (w−i) and
w∗−i(wi) yield a subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 7 For any specification of wholesale prices, the symmetric equilibrium quantity in the
retailer subgame of the DD configuration is smaller than the symmetric equilibrium quantity in the
17
CD configuration game. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium quantity in the overall DD configuration
game is smaller than that in the CD configuration game.14
Proof: For clarity, denote the integrated firm i’s profit in the CD configuration, as V CDi . We know
that V CDi = (Kixi)(Kixi + K−ix−i)
θ−1 − ciKβii xmii (Kixi + K−ix−i)−ni − Ei + Qi xix−i . Denote Ri’s
profit in the DD configuration as V DDi .










i (Kixi + K−ix−i)
θ−1
Denoting a = α+1
α











−ni − niKixmii A−ni−1)− wiKi(axa−1i Aθ−1 − (1− θ)Kixai Aθ−2)
(10)






−ni − niKixmii A−ni−1)− wiKi(axa−1i Aθ−1 − (1− θ)Kixai Aθ−2)
= x−1i a(ciβiy
βi




(aA− (1− θ)Ki)(ciβiyβii − wiyi)
(aA−(1−θ)Ki) > 0 because a > 1 and 0 ≤ θ < 1. If Mi’s profit is increasing in the quantity yi sold
to Ri, then from Fact 2, ciβiy
βi












V DDi and V
CD














. Thus, for any given x−i, the best response x∗i and hence y
∗
i is smaller
in the DD configuration than in the CD configuration. The reaction functions x∗i (x−i) and x
∗
−i(xi)
are shifted closer to the origin in the DD configuration, and so is the symmetric equilibrium.
3.2 Multiple Brand Case
The notation we use is identical to that used in section 2.2. The profit function for manufacturer

















14Through numerical studies, we observe the following effect of decentralization on asymmetric equilibria. The
retailer that prices low in the CD configuration asymmetric equilibrium, prices still lower in the asymmetric equi-
librium of the retailer subgame in the DD configuration (if such an equilibrium exists). Vice-versa for the retailer
that prices high. The absence of scale economies at the retailers’ in the DD configuration diminishes the effect of




























, where a = α+1
α
, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξ1, and 1 ≤ k ≤ ξ2.
Fact 4 Manufacturer Mi’s profit function VMi is strictly jointly convex and increasing in yi =
{yij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi} if yij > ( cijβijwij )
1
1−βij ∀j.
Proof: VMi(yi) is separable in the components of yi; i.e., we can write VMi(yi) =
∑
j VMij(yij), where
VMij(yij) = wijyij − cijyβijij . From Fact 2, we know that VMij is strictly convex and increasing in





1−βij . Since VMi(yi) is separable and its separate parts are strictly convex and







Fact 5 Given wholesale prices wijs, retailer Ri’s profit function Vi is strictly jointly concave in
xijs if mij − nij > 1 ∀j. Thus, if mij − nij > 1 ∀j, there exists there exists a vector of prices
p∗i = {p∗ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi} (where p∗ij = x∗ij−
1
α ), that uniquely maximizes Vi.





















θ−1 is strictly jointly convex in xijs. Since the sum of jointly convex functions is again





θ−1 (where Aijs are
positive constants), assuming that mi1 − ni1 > 1.
mi1−ni1 > 1 ⇒ aβi1− (1− θ)βi1 > 1 ⇒ a− (1− θ) > 1, since 0 < βi1 < 1. The proof of Lemma
4 can be replicated by replacing m with a, and n with (1− θ).
Proposition 5 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the
retailers.
Proof: Given wholesale prices wijs, the strategy space Si = {xij : xij ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xij ≤ Bij}ξi of
retailer i is a non-empty compact convex subset of the Euclidean space <ξi . The profit function Vi is
continuous in x := (xi,x−i) and concave in xi, where xi ∈ Si,x−i ∈ S−i. Therefore, using Theorem
1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
subgame between the retailers.
The proof of the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium in the overall DD game is similar
to the proof of Lemma 6 and is therefore omitted. The proof of the existence of a subgame perfect
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the overall game is similar to the proof of Corollary 1 and is also
omitted.
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Corollary 2 For any specification of wholesale prices, the symmetric equilibrium quantities in the
retailer subgame of the DD configuration are respectively smaller than the symmetric equilibrium
quantities in the CD configuration game. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium quantities in the overall
DD configuration game are respectively smaller than those in the CD configuration game.
Proof: Since the profit function of each retailer Ri is jointly concave in the xijs, the first order
condition with respect to each xij must hold at the maximum of the respective retailer’s profit
function. The remainder of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 7 mutatis mutandis.
4 Decentralized Shared (DS) Configuration
In the DS structure, M and Ris are separate entities. The sequence of actions in this game is as
follows. M decides on the linear wholesale prices wijs to offer to the Ris, then the Ris simultane-
ously decide their sets of offerings {(i, j, pij)}, demand for each offering is realized, and finally costs
are spent and revenues are received.
4.1 Single Brand Case






i , and that for retailer Ri is





Fact 6 Manufacturer M ’s profit function VM is strictly jointly convex and increasing in y = {yi, i =
1, 2} if yi > ( ciβiwi )
1
1−βi ∀i.
Proof: VM(y) is separable in the components of y; i.e., we can write VM(y) =
∑
i VMi(yi), where






1−βi . Since VM(y) is separable and its separate parts are strictly convex and increasing,
we have that VM is strictly jointly convex and increasing in y = {yi, i = 1, 2} if yi > ( ciβiwi )
1
1−βi ∀i.
Fact 7 Given wholesale prices wis, retailer Ri’s profit function Vi is strictly concave in xi if mi −
ni > 1. Thus, if mi − ni > 1, there exists p∗i = x∗i−
1
α that uniquely maximizes Vi.
Proof: Identical to the proof of Fact 3. Hence omitted.
Proposition 6 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the
retailers.
20
Proof: Given wholesale prices wis, the strategy space Si = {xi : xi ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi} of retailer i, is
a non-empty compact convex subset of the Euclidean space <1. The profit function Vi is continuous
in x := (xi, x−i) and concave in xi. Therefore, using Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998),
there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the retailers.
For both the single brand as well as the multiple brand cases of the DS configuration, the proof
of the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium in the overall game is similar to the proof of Lemma
6 and is therefore omitted. Also, the proof of the existence of a subgame perfect pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the overall game is similar to the proof of Corollary 1 and is omitted.
Lemma 8 The symmetric equilibrium quantity in the overall DS configuration game is no less than
that in the overall DD configuration game.
Proof: We prove the lemma by argument. In the DD game, manufacturer Mi chooses wi conditional
on the competing manufacturer’s w−i in order to achieve the largest equilibrium yi. However, in
the DS game, since the same manufacturer M supplies to both retailers, the choice of both wi
as well as w−i is within the control of M . Manufacturer M thus optimizes over a set larger than
that available to each of the Mis in the DD game. Hence M cannot be worse off than the Mis.
Since, by construction, a manufacturer’s profit is increasing in quantity sold, we can conclude that
manufacturer M sells no less than manufacturer Mi, to retailer Ri.
4.2 Multiple Brand Case
The notation we use is identical to that used in section 3.2. The profit function for manufacturer














































, where a = α+1
α
, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξ1, and 1 ≤ k ≤ ξ2.
Fact 8 Manufacturer M ’s profit function VM is strictly jointly convex and increasing in y =
{yij, i = 1, 2; 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi} if yij > ( cijβijwij )
1
1−βij ∀i, j.





VMij(yij) = wijyij − cijyβijij . From Fact 2, we know that VMij is strictly convex and increasing in yij





1−βij . Since VM(y) is separable and its separate parts are strictly convex and increas-








Fact 9 Given wholesale prices wijs, retailer Ri’s profit function Vi is strictly jointly concave in
xijs if mij − nij > 1 ∀j. Thus, if mij − nij > 1 ∀j, there exists there exists a vector of prices
p∗i = {p∗ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ ξi} (where p∗ij = x∗ij−
1
α ), that uniquely maximizes Vi.
Proof: Identical to the proof of Fact 5. Hence omitted.
Proposition 7 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame between the
retailers.
Proof: Given wholesale prices wijs, the strategy space Si = {xij : xij ∈ <1, 0 ≤ xij ≤ Bij}ξi of
retailer i is a non-empty compact convex subset of the Euclidean space <ξi . The profit function Vi is
continuous in x := (xi,x−i) and concave in xi, where xi ∈ Si,x−i ∈ S−i. Therefore, using Theorem
1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
subgame between the retailers.
Corollary 3 The symmetric equilibrium quantities in the overall DS configuration game are re-
spectively no less than those in the overall DD configuration game.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 8.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Recent research supports the belief that supply chain configuration and equilibrium product variety
are closely linked. In this paper we have explored the effects of supply chain configuration on equi-
librium product variety, in a competitive setting. Thus far we have been able to prove important
existence results pertaining to equilibrium variety, and specific properties of such equilibria, under
three distinct supply chain configurations - CD, DD, and DS - depicted in Figure 1. In the CD
configuration, when relative market share is a concern for the vertically integrated retailers, we
find that asymmetric equilibria exist even in symmetric situations. The propensity for asymmet-
ric equilibria in symmetric situations is diminished when, in a decentralized situation, retailers no
longer have manufacturing economies of scale. While we have dealt with the CD configuration
in detail, further analysis with regard to the DD and DS configurations is needed to gain deeper
insights into the relationship between supply chain structure and product variety. In addition, a de-
tailed comparative analysis of equilibrium variety outcomes of the three configurations, is required.
As a further direction, we foresee that an examination of the impact of cost structure on equilib-
rium variety will help us gain a better understanding of equilibria associated with functional variety.
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